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We study the consequences and optimality of alternative speeds of trade liberalization
when investment (restructuring) activities help firms learn their true level of efficiency
and determine survival prospects. In contrast to the existing literature, we find that
a gradual trade reform might be preferred when authorities are more preoccupied
with the longer term. We also show that costs of business closures have an ambiguous
impact on the optimal pace of liberalization.
1. Introduction
THE LAST few years have witnessed the vigorous and widespread application of
policies of economic liberalization in a large and diverse group of countries.
This is particularly true for trade policies. For example, the new consensus on
the benefits of trade openness and export oriented growth has led many
developing countries to start a process of trade liberalization. The political
changes in former socialist countries have created the possibility of a wide
variety of economic reforms. While new questions are continually asked, the
optimal choice of the speed of liberalization remains the critical practical
concern.
Broadly speaking, one can classify the existing literature dealing with the
speed of economic reform into two categories.1 The first strand of the literature
contains models which emphasize the role of economic distortions in the
determination of the optimal speed. The popular belief within this category is
that precipitous liberalization is optimal in the absence of economic frictions
(distortions), while in their presence, the optimal speed depends on the type of
friction. If frictions take the form of adjustment costs (Learner, 1980; Mussa,
1982) then a low speed may be preferable. If there are costs to moving too
slowly (Bruno, 1988), fast reforms may fare better (see also Delias and De Vries,
1995).
The second—and comparatively younger—category stresses the role of
political considerations in the determination of the pace of reform in general.
Lipton and Sachs (1990) attribute the precipitous measures taken in Poland to
fears connected to the danger of credibility loss and resurgent bureaucracy.
1
 There is another related strand which deals with the sequencing of liberalizations of various
sectors of the economy such as the current account, the capital account, financial markets, the
labor market, etc. (see for example Edwards, 1989, 1992; McKinnon, 1991; or Funke, 1993). It is
often argued in that literature that a trade liberalization should precede other reforms but there is
no discussion of the speed of the reform per se.
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Dewatripont and Roland (1992, 1995) argue in favor of gradualism in a model
that explicitly incorporates political constraints.
The general message emerging from the literature is that gradualism is
desirable when short-term considerations are important. On the other hand,
long-term efficiency would recommend a precipitous reform. In this paper we
would like to challenge this view. We show that gradualism might be superior
when longer-term considerations are more important. Moreover, we show that
high short term restructuring costs might justify a 'big bang' reform.
Most models examining the speed of reform miss an important aspect,
namely, that agents usually face a significantly different environment as a result
of economic reform. Adaptation to the new conditions may require the
restructuring of operations, the improvement of productivity and so on.
Typically, some firms survive this experience while others do not. A fundamental
issue then concerns the process by which the firms learn how well suited they
are for operating in the transformed economy and whether they have made the
right choice of activities.
The uncertainty that accompanies liberalization can be resolved either in a
gradual or in a precipitous manner. Alternative reform paces may be associated
with differences in the speed, accuracy, and cost of learning about the new
environment. Thus, different speeds of reforms in general have different
revealing properties for economic agents. We believe that the revelation
properties of different speeds represent a critical aspect of any substantial
reform. If the properties of the learning process affect the overall feasibility as
well as the cost of the reform, then it is useful to try to spell out the interactions
between the optimal speed of reform and learning.
Of all the possible sources of uncertainty that might arise in a liberalization
process, we select to study one that looks at the performance of the private
sector.2 We start with the plausible assumption that firms are heterogeneous.
They come in different types, each type being associated with different relative
talents. In a sheltered environment, it is quite conceivable that firms have neither
the opportunity nor the incentive to attempt to learn their true level of
competitiveness. Subsequently, when trade is liberalized, a firm may not know
how successful it will prove in its particular line of business or what kind of
activity represents its comparative advantage. If performance depends on firm
2
 The relationship between gradualism and learning has also been studied in papers on economic
stabilization which, however, emphasize different sources of uncertainty. For example, in Bertocchi
and Spagat (1992) the policymaker is uncertain about the expectations formation mechanism of
the private sector, while in Bertocchi and Spagat (1997), he is uncertain about the structural
parameters of the economy. In the latter paper, the speed of learning is determined uniquely by
the speed of liberalization; in our paper, the relationship between these two speeds is ambiguous,
depending also on firm restructuring activities. In Cukierman and Liviatan (1992), there exist
different types of policymakers and the public learns about which type they face. On the other
hand, Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) examine the role of individual uncertainty in trade reform but
do not focus on the pace of liberalization. Finally, Dewatripont and Roland (1992) study the role
of individual uncertainty which is private information, while Dewatripont and Roland (1995)
include aggregate reform uncertainty.
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type, and there is a relationship between luck and effort and between effort and
firm type, then a firm may be able to learn—at least partially—about its ability
to compete by making the appropriate investments (effort). For instance, an
incumbent sheltered firm can find out about its prospects for survival in the
new environment by undertaking some restructuring activities. In general,
restructuring (investment) accomplishes two things. First it contributes positively
to the profitability of those firms that have made the right choice (they have
chosen an activity that matches their strengths). And second, by making it easier
for the firm to discover its type,3 it serves as a fitness revelation mechanism
and improves the long-term allocation of resources.
In this paper we assume that the more extensive the restructuring activities,
the greater the informational value of observed performance for evaluating
competitiveness. The resolution of uncertainty may not in general be perfect
(at least in the medium run) because performance also contains elements of
chance. Subsequently, some firms may fail (not fail) even if they restructure
simply because of bad (good) luck.
We examine how the speed of liberalization affects the incentives to, as well
as the degree of, restructuring. We then trace the repercussions for profitability
as well as the accuracy of type revelation. The latter issue is important because
of the implications of revelation for the long-term decisions of the firms. Limited
restructuring activities coupled with bad luck may cause many would-be
efficient firms to mistakenly conclude that they do not have good long term
prospects and exit (similarly, inefficient firms may decide to prolong their stay).
The speed of reform can affect the quality of learning through its effects on the
amount of restructuring.
In this framework, gradualism has attractive properties as it is more revealing
than precipitousness. This new informational angle generates a number of
interesting results concerning the pace of reform, some of which are at variance
with the conventional wisdom in the area. We show that even in the
absence of specific market frictions—such as credit market imperfections—there
is no presumption that a big bang approach is optimal. Moreover, the
informational dimension of reform may make gradualism optimal in situations
in which the government looks beyond the short term as far as allocation of
resources is concerned. Gradualism's superior longer term performance is due
to the fact that it supports higher firm profits in the early stages of reform.
Higher profits make investment in restructuring (and hence revelation) more
affordable.
Our analysis offers new insights on the optimal speed of reform when the
government is concerned about the short run implications of firm closures
independent of firm type (for well known reasons, such as the increase in the
3
 In situations without restructuring where learning would be completely passive, it might be
possible for a fast speed of reform to be associated with faster learning (see Bertocchi and Spagat,
1997).
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rate of unemployment).4 It turns out that gradualism is not necessarily
associated with a lower rate of business closures. This is because the commonly
held belief, that firm closures are fewer the less draconian the measures (i.e.
under a gradualistic program), may not be true when the firms are engaging
in self-selection. The speed of liberalization and the short-term rate of firm
failures can be negatively correlated when the proportion of competitive
(efficient) firms in the industry is small. This is because restructuring activities
and revelation are smaller with precipitousness (as expected profits are smaller),
which makes many inefficient firms prolong their stay in business. However, a
presumption of a positive relationship still remains.
The next section presents the model where firms learn their abilities by
restructuring. We examine the optimal reaction of firms to a gradual and to a
precipitous trade liberalization. In Section 3, we analyze the optimal speed of
trade reform for a government maximizing welfare. Section 4 offers some
concluding comments.
2. The model
2.1. General framework
We use a two-period model to examine the liberalization of a domestic sector
protected from foreign competition. Initially, the firms enjoy commercial
protection via a combination of subsidies and trade barriers (our analysis can
easily accommodate other forms of protection). Imports pay an ad valorem tariff
t that drives a wedge between world prices, p*, and domestic prices, p
(p = p*(l + t)). We define a gradual liberalization to be the policy that
eliminates the subsidies during the first period and the tariff during the second.5
A precipitous one involves the simultaneous removal of both protective
measures in the first period.
The sector consists of a continuum of firms, each one associated with
a real number in the interval (0,1) (one can alternatively assume the
existence of a countable number of firms). Before the liberalization, existing
firms in this sector are assumed to behave similarly and also to be less efficient
than foreign firms. To become more competitive, domestic firms will need to
* Aghion and Blanchard (1994) argue that a fast speed of liberalization may prove detrimental
in the long run because of its undesirable effects on unemployment They argue in favor of a
program of job creation before the implementation of liberalization.
5
 There exist alternative ways for dealing with the speed of liberalization. One involves a single
policy variable (or instance, either taxes or subsidies) and whose level is adjusted either precipitously
or gradually. Our results are robust to such modeling. Another one could define gradual
liberalization to involve first the removal of the tariff and later the removal of the subsidies. Under
some structures of subsidies, our main results would survive. With lump-sum subsidies, however,
a tariff-first reform has a different impact on firms: the tariff affects positively production, while
the lump-sum subsidy in general does not. Consequently, while our analysis focuses on the speed
of reform its implications regarding the sequencing depend on the form of the subsidy.
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restructure.6 For simplicity, we assume that restructuring takes place only
during the first period (allowing it to continue in the second period does not
affect the results in any significant way).
Let the population of firms consist of two types, high and low, and assume
that high type firms have an absolute advantage in this sector (they are efficient)
while no type has an absolute advantage in the other sectors.7 Let the share
of the high types in the population be known and equal to m.
The type of a firm is initially unknown and can only be revealed through
restructuring activities.8 Moreover, revelation is assumed to be only partial as
firms infer their type from a random output. When restructuring does not take
place, then there is no information regarding type. If x represents the degree of
restructuring in the first period, then firm output in both periods is assumed
to be given by
yH = HH + Hx) for the high type! ^
yL = \xL for the low type J
where F(x) is increasing and concave and F(Q) = 0. Thus we consider the case
where restructuring benefits only the high type.9 The level of output of a single
firm, y,, i = H, L is observable, but fia and /iL are unobservable random
variables distributed over exactly the same domain, with the same mean \i. Each
firm is randomly assigned a draw from the fiH distribution if it is a high type
and from the \iL distribution if it is a low type. The firm, having observed a
level of output y, must draw an inference about its true type based on its
knowledge of the probability distribution of the //'s,10 and decide whether to
continue production in this sector.
The cost of production is assumed to be c{x) + B, where c(x) is the cost of
restructuring and B is a constant measuring payments to other factors of
production (assumed constant in the analysis). We will require that fj. < B/pl
which implies that all firms have negative expected profits with no restructuring.
Obviously, expected profits are negative for the low type independent of the
pace of liberalization and the degree of restructuring. Consequently, if a firm
6
 A natural question arises as to why the firms do not carry out the restructuring before the
liberalization. A simple story would involve a subsidy that guaranteed firms a certain level of profits
independent of the degree of restructuring. Such guaranteed profits together with a small,
non-recoverable—through the subsidy—personal cost of restructuring to the managers of the firm
would suffice to avert it. If the personal cost takes the form of a fixed number then it can be left
out in the analysis of restructuring under liberalization without any consequences.
7
 We can alternatively define types in terms of comparative advantage and assign absolute
advantage to one type in all activities (see Delias, 1992).
8
 It is possible that different restructuring activities contribute differently to type revelation and
productivity. And also that revelation can occur through activities other than restructuring. Such
possibilities add a portfolio choice dimension but do not affect the spirit of the analysis.
9
 This particular specification is adopted so that the properties of the misclassification function
can be easily analyzed. See the Appendix for a more general discussion.
10
 In this model, the firm must infer its type from only one observation of output (in the first
period). It is trivial to allow for multiple observations as the basis of inference (see Delias, 1992,
for an application).
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knew with certainty that it was of the low type it would find it optimal to exit.
The appropriate choice of parameter values can guarantee the existence of a
range of restructuring activities over which the expected profits of the high types
are positive.
In general, due to an unfavorable output level, some of the high type firms
that operated during the first period may end up assigning to themselves a high
probability of being a low type and exiting in the second period. Similarly,
some low types which were active in the first period may decide to continue
producing in the second period. Let qH(x) be the probability that a high firm
stops producing and qL(x) the probability that a low firm continues producing
after observing performance in the first period. Consequently, (1 — qH)m high
types correctly infer their type and remain in business, while qHm mistakenly
perceive themselves as the low type and exit. Similarly, qL{\ — m) low type firms
erroneously decide to stay while the remaining (1 — qL)(\ — m) exit. In the
second period, proportions qH and (1 — qL) of the remaining high and low type
firms close down.
Misclassification has two negative effects. On the one hand, the economy
cannot exploit all its efficiency gains from production since some high type
firms stop producing. On the other hand, the economy is wasting resources as
some low type firms stay in business. Thus, a reduction in the probabilities of
misclassification, qH and qL, is highly desirable. An important issue is how the
degree of restructuring affects the misclassification error. This issue is discussed
in detail in the Appendix. It is shown that restructuring reduces at least one
type of these errors and possibly both of them.
2.2. Optimal restructuring under perfect capital markets
Consider the decision problem of a firm on the eve of a liberalization attempt.
The firm starts with a prior belief of type and decides whether it will undertake
some restructuring activities in order to remain in business. If it does, then it
draws an amount of output from the perspective probability distribution (eqs
(1)). Upon observing its output level it updates its prior and then decides
whether it will continue producing in the second period or not. In the first
period, a firm faces the following lifetime expected profits
Ein = maxflTjTi! + max{(5£17i2, 0}], 0} (2)
X
where n is profits, £ , is the expectation before restructuring and 5 is the firm's
private discount factor. E^Uy and EJTTJ a r e profits conditional on staying in
business during periods 1 and 2 respectively and are given by
{ji + F(x)] + (1 - 0H1)/i} - lc{x) + B]
= p*El{9H2\ji + F{x)] + (1 - 0H2)n} - B
where 9Hl is the firm's prior belief (before restructuring) and 9H2 is its posterior
belief (after having observed output in the first period) of being the high type.
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pl is the price in the first period and p* is the price faced in the second period.
If Pi is the domestic price under a tariff, i.e. px = (1 + t)p*, then eq. (2)
represents expected profits under gradualism. Setting px = p* in (2) gives
expected profits under a precipitous reform.
A firm11 restructures if maxCE,?^) + max{5Eln2,0} > 0. A firm stays in
business during the second period if E2n2 > 0, that is, if {9H2[p + F(x)~\ +
(1 — 0H2)n) > B/p*. The Appendix presents in detail the determination of the
exit decision.
Let us assume agnostic firms, that is, 9Hl = m. The expected profits of a firm
that undertakes an amount of restructuring equal to x is then12
E{n = Eln1 + SEln2 = Pi\m(p. + F(x)) + (1 - m)^ - [c(x) + B]
+ <5{p*[m(l - qH(x))(M + F(x)) + (1 - m)qL(x)A
- [m(l - qH(x)) + (1 - m)qL{x)-]B) (3)
The term multiplied by S in (3) gives expected profits in the second period.
Only the high types who correctly infer their type (m(l — qH(x))) make profits.
The total number of firms operating in the second period is m(l — qH(x)) +
(1 — m)qL(x). Notice that the cost of restructuring is only borne in the first
period. Benefits from restructuring, on the other hand, are also obtained in the
second period as greater restructuring implies a higher return for high type
firms and may also lead to lower misclassification errors.
The optimal degree of restructuring is determined by setting the derivative
of (3) with regard to x equal to zero. This gives the following condition
dE^/dx = dE^nJdx +
= {PlmF'(x) - c'(x)} + d{p*m[l - qH(xftF'(x)
- mlp*(ji + F(x)) - B-]q'H{x) + (1 - m)[p*n - B]q'L(x)} = 0 (4)
where ' denotes the first derivative. The various effects of an increase in x can
be seen through the terms of (4). First, profits of the high type firm in
the second period increase. Second, foregone profits of a misclassified high type
firm decrease if q'H < 0 (note that p*(ji + F) - B > 0, otherwise the high types
would be unprofitable too). The losses of a misclassified low type firm decrease
if q'L < 0 (in the Appendix we present sufficient conditions under which
1
' Remember that firms are similar ex ante. Firms could also be heterogeneous initially and the
entry decision as well as the degree of restructuring could differ across firms. The simplest way of
accomplishing this involves postulating that the firms differ regarding their prior beliefs of their
type. Optimist firms would then be more likely to both enter and restructure extensively than
pessimist firms.
12
 Note that (3) requires that the sector as a whole cannot find itself in a corner solution in the
second period (that is, with either all of the firms staying or exiting). This requirement is easily
fulfilled by having each individual firm associated with a different draw from the perspective p.di.
and making the space of output outcomes suitably span the space of firms. Then there exist firms
for which 0H1 approaches zero and firms for which 8H1 approaches unity. As far as the first period
is concerned, the suitable choice of parameter values can always guarantee an interior solution for x.
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restructuring leads to lower misclassification for either one or both types). For
the remainder of the analysis it will be assumed that q'H(x) and q'L(x) are indeed
negative.
Clearly if the expected gains from restructuring are smaller than the expected
costs for any x > 0, firms will exit the sector before period 1. For instance, this
could be the case if the fraction of low types in the population were very large.
Nonetheless, the appropriate choice of parameter values can guarantee that
Exn > 0 for a subset of x > 0. The second order condition is Cl = p^nxF" — c" —
25p*mF'q'H — 5m[p*(ji + F) — B~]q"H + 5(1 — m)[p*/z — B]q"L, where " denotes
the second derivative. A sufficient condition for an interior maximum is that
Exn > 0 for some x > 0 and that Q < 0. The latter is satisfied if the production
function is concave and both the cost function and the functions giving the
probability of misclassification are convex. Assuming that perfect revelation can
never be attained no matter how much restructuring is undertaken is sufficient
to guarantee the convexity of the latter functions (when ^ x ) and q'L(x) are
negative). From now on, we assume that there exists a positive level of
restructuring that maximizes profits and therefore that (4) holds.
To compare the level of restructuring across the precipitous and gradualistic
cases we only need to totally differentiate (4). Given that the second order
conditions for a maximum are satisfied, it is straightforward to show that
dx/dpl > 0, which implies that restructuring is higher under gradualism. Profits
in each period are also higher. The reason for this is that output prices are
higher in the first period under gradualism (relative to precipitousness).
If q'H and q'L are negative then restructuring has two effects regarding the
waste of resources. First, it lowers the type misclassification error and hence
leads to a more efficient long term allocation of resources. At the same time, it
involves a useless investment on the part of the firms that will prove to be
non-competitive. Consequently, short and long term consideration will tend to
pull in opposite directions regarding the evaluation of the properties of
alternative paces of reform.13
We have implicitly assumed that firms had all the funds necessary to
restructure and continue producing as long as their expected profits were
positive. However, a serious problem faced by restructuring firms in reforming
economies is that the availability of external—to the firm—credit is limited.
Hence firms that cannot make an operating profit may be forced out of business
even when they would be profitable in the long run. The analysis of how the
presence of borrowing constraints affects the incentive to restructure can be
easily carried out. It can be shown that the optimal level of restructuring is
lower under either pace of liberalization.
13
 A qualification is in order here. Our two period setup draws too sharp a distinction between
the short and the long run. With an infinite horizon, the low types will eventually discover their
type and exit. So they are misdassified in the medium rather than the long term. There are long
term implications for the high types, though, who misdassify themselves and exit after the first
period.
P. BACCHETTA AND H. DELLAS 299
3. The optimal path of liberalization
Gradualism was shown to have some desirable features. For instance it
produces a more efficient long-run allocation of resources; it reduces the number
of banruptcies of efficient firms, etc. Nevertheless, the model presented above
is a partial equilibrium one as it only analyzes the production side of a particular
sector. The effects of the tariff that remains in existence under gradualism,
however, are not limited to producers. To be able to evaluate the overall
consequences of reform, it is necessary to examine the impact on other agents:
consumers and the government.14 Instead of representing consumption and
government revenues explicitly, we use the function £(r) to represent the
aggregate cost of a tariff t > 0. Most trade models would imply that this
function is positive and increasing: while a tariff represents a government
revenue, it is more than offset by the loss in consumer surplus. Moreover, we
assume that with no distortion in the economy the cost ( of the tariff is higher
than the benefit to firms, i.e. £'(0 > dnjdt at t = 0. This simply reflects the view
that in a small economy with no distortion the optimal tariff is zero.
The optimal path of liberalization depends on the structure of the economy
and on the objective function of the social planner.
3.1. Perfect capital markets
Assume that the social welfare function W is simply equal to aggregate firm
profits minus the aggregate cost of the tariff. Given that there is a large number
of firms, aggregate profits are equal to expected profits (by the law of large
numbers). Thus
W = £ 1 J T 1 + / ? £ 1 J I 2 - C ( 0 (5)
where 0 < fi < 1 is a social discount factor. Recall that the private discount
factor is equal to S. ft is greater (smaller) than 5 if the policymakers value the
long term more (less) than the private sector.
The optimal path of liberalization is simply given by the level of tariff in the
first period, t, which maximizes W. If t = 0, a precipitous liberalization is
preferred. If t > 0, a gradual liberalization is superior. In this case, the optimal
level of the tariff can also be determined. The optimal t is given by the first
order condition of (3) with respect to t
cUV/dt = dEynJdt - C'(0 + {dExnJdx + fidE^nJdx) dx/dt «S 0 (6)
A tariff has three effects: a positive direct effect on n: through an increase in
p{, an increase in the cost (; and an indirect effect through the amount of
restructuring, x. As mentioned above, the sum of the first two terms is
14
 We assume that the sector is small and ignore the other sectors of the economy. A more
general equilibrium analysis with a multi-sector economy is of considerable interest, but is left for
future research.
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negative (by assumption). Thus, to have an interior solution to (6) with t > 0
the last term must be positive. When fi = 5, however, the last term is equal to
zero (from (4), and the envelope theorem). In this case, we are at a corner
solution and t = 0, which means that a precipitous liberalization is optimal.
Hence, the type revealing properties of gradualism are not sufficient per se to
justify a gradual liberalization as they are offset by the efficiency cost of
protection.
When /? is larger than <5, the last term in (6) becomes positive (dnjdx > 0)
and can offset the first two terms. This means that when the long term (i.e.
second period) allocation is given more weight by the government than by the
private sector, a gradual liberalization might be preferred. This is an interesting
result because according to conventional wisdom, the greater the emphasis on
long-term welfare at the expense of short-term, the faster the optimal rate of
liberalization ought to be.
Is there any compelling justification for the discrepancy between the social
and private discount factors? This is an issue that has received a great deal of
attention in the literature. Broadly speaking, such a possibility arises in the
presence of intertemporal externalities. In our case, such externalities might
arise from wanting to have only the right type of firms operating in the long
run (that is, long-term efficiency could be made an argument in the social welfare
function, perhaps of long-term growth externalities). A more mundane reason
could be the existence of distortionary taxation of investment income. Note,
however, that the adoption of a political economy approach in which the social
discount factor is derived endogenously in a political equilibrium would make
it harder to generate a discrepancy between the social and private discount
factors.
Finally, it can be shown that under imperfect capital markets gradualism is
more likely to be optimal when the proportion of high type firms (m) is large
and when restructuring has strong revealing properties. The reason is that
gradualism increases firms' cash flows, allowing the good firms to carry on.
3.2. Social costs of business closure
A business closure may involve costs other than those internalized by the closing
firm (a typical example is the payment of unemployment benefits by the state
when the workers are not relocated immediately to other jobs).15 For simplicity,
let us assume that the social cost of a firm closure is linear and equal to e. In
our model, a firm may shut down during one of three possible instances: just
before the liberalization; at the end of the first period; and at the end of the
second period. Let us denote by n0, nu and n2 the number of firms (as a share
of the total number of firms) that shut down during these three instances.
There are two possible cases: if expected profits are negative (E{n < 0),
13
 Dewatripont and Roland (1992) examine the impact of these costs in a two-period model of
reform with asymmetric information between firms and the government.
P. BACCHETTA AND H. DELLAS 301
then n0 = 1 and n, = n2 = 0, i.e. all firms leave the sector before the liberaliza-
tion. In this case, the authorities could contemplate imposing some minimum
tariff t* such that E^nit*) = 0. It is easy to see that it will be optimal to
temporarily protect an inefficient sector via a gradualistic pace when e > ((£*),
that is, when the social costs of business closure are high compared to the cost
of a tariff. This is the case where the authorities temporarily protect a sector
that might not be viable in the long run.
If expected profits are positive {E^n ^ 0) then n0 = 0, nx= qum +
0 + <7z.)0 — m) and n2 = qH(\ — qH)m + 9L(1 ~ 9L)(1 — "0- One c a n n o w
postulate a social welfare function (assuming /? = 5 and perfect capital markets)
as follows
W = £7r, + 5En2 - £(t) - <K«i + n2) (7)
The corresponding first order condition with respect to t (again using (4)
and the envelope theorem) is
dW/dt = dEnJdt - C'(0 - eidnjdx + dnjdx)(dx/dt) < 0 (8)
where dnl/dx + dnjdx = 2mq'H(l — qH) — 2(1 — m)q'LqL. Again, the sum of the
first two terms in (8) is negative. The sign of the last term, i.e. the effect of a
tariff on the number of closures, is ambiguous. A gradual reform is more
revealing. Hence it decreases the number of high type firms that close down,
but it increases the number of low type firms that go out of business. The overall
impact obviously depends on the proportion of each type and on the mis-
classification error. As an illustration, assume that qL{x) = qH(x) = q(x) for all
x. Then dnjdx + dn-Jdx = 2q(m — q). If m > q, the last term in (6) is positive
and gradualism may be favored; that is, gradualism is more desirable when the
proportion of efficient firms in the sector is large.
The intuition is simple. Recall that a higher level of restructuring implies that
a larger share of truly efficient firms (high types) and a smaller share of inefficient
firms remain in business. If the proportion of high type firms in the population
exceeds that of the low type then gradual liberalization will be associated with
a smaller rate of business closures. If this effect and the social cost of
bankruptcies are large, then a gradual reform can be optimal. If, on the other
hand, there are many inefficient firms in the industry and the government is
very much concerned about their possible exit then it may try to prevent those
firms from correctly inferring their type (and exiting) by adopting a precipitous
pace of reform (which limits restructuring). What is interesting about this latter
case is the fact that the pace of liberalization and the rate of business closures
are negatively related. Unlike the popular presumption which claims the
presence of an unambiguously positive link between these two, our analysis
identifies reasonable circumstances involving imperfect information and learning
under which the relation can be negative. Advocates of a slow pace who base
their position on the short-run social costs of business closures must then qualify
their view as it is only valid for industries which were characterized by a high
proportion of efficient firms before the implementation of liberalization.
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The other crucial determinants of the optimal speed of reform in this case
are the revealing properties of restructuring for both low and high type firms,
i.e. the values of q'H and q'L (dnjdx + dn2/dx is a weighted average). A gradual
reform is more likely to be optimal when q'H is large and q'L small. This simply
means that trade liberalization tends to produce few business closures, be they
of the high or the low type.
How likely is it that the relationship between the pace of liberalization and
the rate of business closures will turn out to be negative? The analysis
throughout the paper has been based on the assumption that both q'^x) and
q'L(x) are negative. It is worth mentioning, however, that as shown in the
Appendix, restructuring is far more likely to decrease qH(x) than qL(x). If qH(x)
decreases but qL(x) increases then the relationship between the pace of
liberalization and the rate of business closures will unambiguously be positive.
4. Conclusion
In this paper, we examined the role of firm specific uncertainty in the dynamics
of trade liberalization. We showed that such uncertainty creates some interest-
ing possibilities regarding the pace of economic reform, possibilities that do not
always square with the currently accepted views on these issues. We have shown
that, in general, the case for gradualism becomes stronger when there is great
emphasis on the longer term allocation of resources (because of informational
considerations rather than policy reversal concerns that have been suggested
in the existing literature). Interestingly, a big bang approach may prove superior
under circumstances that defy conventional wisdom. For instance, we have
shown that precipitousness may be optimal when the government is mostly
concerned about the social cost of business closures.
Do these results represent theoretical curiosities that are of limited empirical
relevance? To answer this question we need to evaluate the importance of
the informational considerations associated with restructuring in a changing
environment that are emphasized in this paper. We feel that uncertainty with
regard to the level of true ability (competitiveness) plays a fundamental role in
the determination of the characteristics of all occupational-entrepreneurial
choices. This is even more true when the economic environment is undergoing
a rapid, dramatic change of the sort associated with economic reform. Existing
theories of reform have ignored the learning, type revelation, effects of
investment and may thus offer only a partial view of liberalization.
Some of the ideas in this paper are reminiscent of the infant industry
argument Firms start from an inefficient position and gradualism is similar to
temporary protection. The infant industry argument advocates such a protec-
tion when there are distortions like imperfect capital markets (e.g. see Baldwin,
1969) or externalities and dynamic learning (see Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1988;
Krugman, 1987; Rauch, 1992; Succar, 1987). This literature, however, takes for
granted that all the infant firms will grow (in the absence of moral hazard
problems), without the influence of any factors of chance. On the other hand,
P. BACCHETTA AND H. DELLAS 303
our analysis assumes the presence of heterogeneous firms, some of which are
capable of growing and some not. It associates infancy with a different form of
learning from that identified in the literature: learning about comparative
advantage rather than learning how to do things. It also relates the desirability
of infant protection to the distribution of firm types within the industry. In this
sense, the present paper can also be thought of as adding another important,
realistic, dimension to the analysis of infant industries.
The model presented has several implications that could be tested empirically.
For example, it implies that the speed of economic liberalization is negatively
related to the magnitude of restructuring-investment activities. One can also
examine how q and q' (which play a critical role in our analysis) vary
with the pace of reform by examining the empirical distribution of firm
performance as a function of the amount of industry restructuring. If the tails
of the distribution become more prolongated and acquire larger mass when
restructuring is more intensive then one can argue that restructuring enhances
revelation.
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APPENDIX
This Appendix offers a detailed discussion of a firm's learning problem. Let y, be the output of a
firm i, / = H, L. If i = H then y has the density function GH(x, fiH); otherwise, it has the density
GL(x, fiL), where ftH and fiL are random variable representing the contribution of luck, and E is
the expectations operator. The G functions are assumed to satisfy the conditions
£(>>|GH)>£(.y |GL)foral lx>0 (i)
d{E(y\GH)/dx) > d{E(y\GL)/dx} (ii)
that is, the high type has an absolute advantage in the activity under consideration; and
restructuring helps the high type more than the low type. The individual firm knows the form of
the G functions but does not know whether its output came from GH or GL.
An individual firm starts out with a prior belief of being of the high type, say, 0Hl. After drawing
an observation, y, in the first period, it updates its prior according to the Bayesian formula
u =
oHI<Hy\n) + (i
where 0H2 is the posterior probability of being an H-type after having observed y, and tp(y\i) is
the likelihood function of y for type i.
A firm decides to remain in business in the second period if expected profits are positive, that is, if
P*IOH2EGU + (1 - 6B1)EGL] > B (9)
where we are using £G, as a shorthand for E(y\G,). (9) can be written as
0H1 > (10)
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Using the definition of the posterior probability the above criterion reduces to
j,(y\L) EGH-B/p* 6HI
B/p*-EGL\-8H1
Given 0HU B, p*, and G,, eq. (11) determines a cut-off point of output, R, such that for y < R the
firm exits and (or y ^ R the firm remains in business during the second period (whether the cutoff
point is unique or not depends on the form of the p.dX assumed). The LHS of (11) depends both
on the p.dJ. of fi, as well as on the influence of restructuring on output performance. Due to
condition (ii), increased restructuring pushes the two p.dl.s further apart, something that aids type
discrimination for any required Bul. At the same time, though, restructuring may also affect the
other moments of the two p.di.s, which can be a source of ambiguity (for instance, if the variance
of output were an increasing function of x). Moreover, restructuring increases expected profits in
the second period for any given 9H2, which makes firms inclined to stay even when they feel less
confident about being the high type.
The effects of restructuring on the probability of misclassification (the sign of q'B and q'L) play a
critical role in our analysis. In order to be able to say something concrete about it some structure
must be imposed on the p.d.f. of the /is as well as on the G functions. We assume that16
GH = /J« + F(x), GL = fxL, nH ~ N(ji, 1), nL ~ N(JL, 1), f > 0, F" < 0 (iii)
Using (iii) we have
4>(y\L) [ F(x) I
i^(y|H) V 2 J J
and substituting in (11) results in the following cut-off point (critical value for exit) for y, R
R FJx)_ jFf^Jt^J^Y
2 V B/p*-n l-eHJ
The probability of misclassification for the low type, qL(x), is given by
qL(x) = prob(>> > R|true type = L) = probO - n > R-fi) = prob(Z > R - n) (13)
where Z ~ N(0, 1), and the probability of misclassification for the high type by
qH(x) = prob(y < R|true type = H) = prob(>> - (ji + F(x)) < R - (ji + F(x)))
= prob(Z < R - (n + F(x)))
Equations (13) and (14) imply that signj^} = — sign{dR/dx} and sign{<j'H} = sign{d[R — (p +
F(x))]/dx}. Note that restructuring reduces the misclassification error for at least one type. For
instance, for restructuring to make the high type more likely to commit a misclassification error
(q'H > 0) it is necessary that dR/dx > 0.
With some further manipulation exact conditions can be derived under which the probability of
misclassification is decreasing in x. Namely
q'L < 0 iff R < n + F(x) - I /O + F(x) - B/p*]
q'H < 0 iff R > n - I /O + f(x) - B/p*]
16
 A few notes are in order. First, the important element here as far as tractability is concerned
is that the two p.df.s have the same variance (the particular value does not matter) and that the
variance is not affected by restructuring. Revelation would be stronger if restructuring decreases
the variance. Second, negative output is allowed only for technical convenience. One could
instead have chosen to work with a truncated normal
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In general, q'u is more likely to be negative whenever there is a large fraction of low types and/or
the cost B is high. Moreover, q'H is more likely to be negative than q'L. This is due to the fact that,
for a given 9H1, restructuring makes it more profitable to remain in business and as a result the
critical value of 6H1 (eq. (10)) decreases. The probability of q'H > 0 is always less than 0.5 while no
such constraint exists for prob(<7i. > 0).
